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L Introduction
Meet Helen Cara Consumer, a 38-year-old resident of Arkansas. Inspired
by the recent reality TV surgery programs, Ms. Consumer put aside a few
paychecks and decided to undergo plastic surgery-a little nip here, a little tuck
there. Ms. Consumer has collected brochures from several area plastic surgery
groups touting the talents of their physicians. Although money is a large
concern for Ms. Consumer, choosing the cheapest doctor does not necessarily
seem like the best idea. Like any reasonable and responsible patient, Ms.
Consumer wants to be sure that the physician she chooses has no skeletons in
his closet-literally. She is especially concerned about plastic surgeon
competency after reading an article about plastic surgeries gone horribly wrong
in a popular women's magazine. Ms. Consumer would like to compare the
doctors' practice histories with their prices. Unfortunately, medical malpractice
information about specific physicians is not readily available to the public in
Arkansas.' What should Ms. Consumer do?
1. See Arkansas State Medical Board, Online Directory, http://www.armedicalboard.
org/directory (allowing users to search for certified physicians who have chosen to be listed in
the Arkansas State Medical Board Directory, but not allowing users to view physicians' medical
malpractice histories, disciplinary actions, or professional sanctioning information) (last visited
Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MODIFYING THE HCQIA
This Note suggests that Congress could easily and pragmatically solve Ms.
Consumer's dilemma. Dissemination of portions of the information in the
National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) maintained by the federal
government-in particular, physician credentials, malpractice judgments, and
disciplinary and licensure actions-would facilitate intelligent consumer
decisions in the current heavily commercialized healthcare industry. Rather
than arguing for the creation of an entirely new system to disseminate physician
information to healthcare consumers, this Note concludes that Congress should
modify the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) to grant the general
public partial access to the information in the NPDB. Part II of this Note will
provide background information pertinent to the ongoing debate over public
access to the NPDB, including past federal legislative attempts to open the
database to the general public. Part III will describe the arguments reflected in
the scholarship opposing public access to the NPDB, especially the presumed
need for confidential error reporting to encourage patient safety. Finally, Part
IV will outline constitutional arguments in favor of granting limited public
access to the information in the NPDB---comparing the information in the
NPDB to commercial speech and comparing physicians to public figures-and
rebut the arguments opposing public access to the NPDB.
I1. Background Information
In 1999, the Institute of Medicine (IOM)2 released its To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System report.3 Most notably, the IOM Report stated
that at least 44,000, and possibly as many as 98,000, Americans die each year
2. See The Institute of Medicine, About, http://www.iom.edu/about.asp (describing the
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies as a non-profit organization established in 1970
to serve as an adviser to the nation to improve health) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). In particular, the IOM "provides unbiased, evidence-
based, and authoritative information and advice concerning health and science policy to policy-
makers, professionals, leaders in every sector of society, and the public at large." Id.
Committees of uncompensated scientists conduct the IOM's research and panels of anonymous
external experts review the reports produced by such committees. The Institute of Medicine,
More About the Institute of Medicine, http://www.iom.edu/subpage.asp?id=4091 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. THE INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM
(Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. The IOM Report also contained
recommendations for improving the quality of healthcare in the United States, focusing on
leadership and knowledge, identifying and learning from errors, setting performance standards
and expectations for safety, and implementing safety systems in healthcare organizations. Id. at
6. See also infra note 40 (summarizing the full IOM recommendations).
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as the result of medical errors.4 The report created quite a stir and drew much
media attention to the faults of the healthcare industry.5 However, long before
the infamous IOM Report, physicians, healthcare administrators, legislators,
and academics had been grappling with issues of healthcare quality, patient
safety, and the public's right to access physician information.
A. The National Practitioner Data Bank
At the time of the 1999 IOM Report, Congress had several mechanisms in
place for improving patient safety.6 Most notably, in response to growing
4. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 26 (explaining that the figures come from extrapolating
the results of two studies-one using 1984 data and one using 1992 data-of preventable
adverse events to the total number of hospital admissions in the United States in 1997).
5. See, e.g., Julie Appleby & Robert Davis, Is Your Doctor Bad? You May Never Know:
Limited Access to Data About Medical Errors Hides Potential Dangers, USA TODAY, Oct. 11,
2000, at lB (exposing the horrific story of a son who discovered a physician's claims of never
losing a patient were false and uncovered the physician's multiple malpractice settlements after
losing his father); see also Stacey Singer, Tragedy Teaches a Lesson: Sharing Data Saves
Lives, SuN-SENTINEL, Oct. 24, 2000, at 1A (describing the death of Florida boy who underwent
surgery to remove scar tissue from his ear and was accidentally injected with adrenaline rather
than the similar-looking lidocaine with epinephrine).
6. This Note focuses on the National Practitioner Data Bank. However, under the
Healthcare Integrity Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Congress authorized
the creation of another federal databank-the Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank
(HIPDB)-to collect healthcare fraud and abuse data. 45 C.F.R. § 61.1 (2004). Government
agencies and healthcare plans are required to report final adverse actions taken against
physicians to the HIPDB. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221(b)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2009-10 (describing the reporting
requirements); 45 C.F.R. §§ 61.7-61.11 (2004) (same); see also Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221(g)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2010-11
(defining a "final adverse action" as a civil judgment related to the delivery of a healthcare
service or item, a federal or state criminal conviction related to the delivery of a healthcare
service or item, actions by federal or state licensing or certification agencies, or exclusion from
participation in a federal or state healthcare program. A "final adverse action" does not include
malpractice claims, a notable distinction between the HIPDB and the NPDB). In exchange for
compliance with reporting requirements, government agencies and health plans may access the
information in the HIPDB. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 221(d)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2010 (stating that the information in the
HIPDB will be available to government agencies and health plans); 45 C.F.R. § 61.12 (2004)
(same). Information in the HIPDB about specific physicians is not available to the general
public, however. See 45 C.F.R. § 61.14 (2004) (limiting access to the HIPDB to the entities
listed in the regulations); see also 45 C.F.R. § 61.12(a)(4) (2004) (stating that a person or entity
may access non-identifying statistical information from the HIPDB); Department of Health and
Human Services, General Public, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/genpublic.html (stating that the
law prohibits disclosure of information about a specific physician to the general public and that
attorneys may not access the information in the HIPDB except in limited circumstances) (last
visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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concerns about the quality of medical care in the United States, Congress had
enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) in 1986. 7 The
HCQIA requires certain healthcare entities--defined as hospitals, entities that
provide healthcare services (including HMOs and group medical practices), and
professional societies of physicians that follow a formal peer review process to
further quality healthcare -to report medical malpractice payments, 9 medical
board licensure actions, 10 and professional review actions" to the NPDB, which
7. 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (2000). Congress found the following:
(1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and the need to improve the
quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that warrant greater
efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State.
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move
from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician's previous
damaging or incompetent performance.
(3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through effective professional peer
review.
(4) The threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws, including
treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, unreasonably discourages
physicians from participating in effective professional peer review.
(5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for
physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
Id. The National Practitioner Data Bank website states that the "NPDB is primarily an alert or
flagging system intended to facilitate a comprehensive review of healthcare practitioners'
professional credentials." Department of Health and Human Services, National Practitioner
Data Bank (NPDB), www.npdb-hipdb.com/npdb.html (last visited Nov. 29,2005) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 11 151(4)(A) (2000) (defining the term "health care entity").
9. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.7 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2000)) (stating that each
entity, including insurance companies, which makes a payment under an insurance policy to
satisfy a medical malpractice settlement or judgment must report the physician's identifying
information (name, address, Social Security number, date of birth, professional school
attendance, and professional license information), the amount of payment, the names of
hospitals with which the physician is affiliated, and a description of the acts and injuries upon
which the claim for payment was based to the NPDB and appropriate state licensing boards);
see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.5(a) (2004) (stating that the NPDB must be notified of a medical
malpractice payment within thirty days from the date of payment).
10. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.8 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11132 (2000)) (stating that a
state medical board which revokes, suspends, places a physician on probation for reasons
relating to the physician's professional competence or professional conduct, or accepts the
surrender of a physician's license must report the physician's identifying information and a
description of the acts and reasons for the licensure action to the NPDB); see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 60.5(b) (2004) (stating that the NPDB must be notified of licensure actions within thirty days
from the date of licensure action).
11. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.9 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (2000)) (stating that a
healthcare entity that takes a professional review action that adversely affects a physician's
clinical privileges for more than thirty days (including surrender of privileges or professional
society membership) must report the physician's identifying information, a description of the
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the Department of Health and Human Services supervises. In exchange for
compliance with reporting requirements, certain medical entities are granted
access to the information in the NPDB.12 In fact, hospitals must consult the
NPDB before accepting a physician into its medical staff or granting clinical
privileges.1 3  Remarkably, despite its focus on improving the quality of
healthcare and patient safety, the HCQIA and final regulations do not allow the
public-the recipients of healthcare-to access the information in the NPDB. 14
B. Information Currently Available to the General Public
Various organizations dedicated to improving the quality of healthcare in
the United States provide the public with physician information in databases on
the Internet. However, no source contains as much valuable, centrally
compiled information as the NPDB. 1 5 For example, the American Medical
acts, and the reasons for sanctioning to the state medical board, and that the state medical board,
in turn, must report the information to the NPDB); see also 45 C.F.R. § 60.5(c) (2004) (stating
that a healthcare entity must report adverse actions to the state medical board within fifteen days
from the date of the adverse action, and the state medical board must, in turn, report the
information to the NPDB within fifteen days of receiving the information).
12. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.11 (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11137 (2000)) (stating that the
physician, hospitals, state licensing boards, and other healthcare entities (including HMOs) may
request information concerning a particular physician from the NPDB). In certain situations a
plaintiff's attorney may request information from the NPDB:
An attorney, or individual representing himself or herself, who has filed a medical
malpractice action or claim in a State or Federal court or other adjudicative body
against a hospital, and who requests information regarding a specific physician,
dentist, or other health care practitioner who is also named in the action or claim.
Provided, that this information will be disclosed only upon the submission of
evidence that the hospital failed to request information from the Data Bank as
required by § 60.10(a), and may be used solely with respect to litigation resulting
from the action or claim against the hospital.
45 C.F.R. § 60.11(a)(5)(2004).
13. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.10(a) (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11135 (2000)) (stating that
hospitals must consult the NPDB when a physician applies to be on the medical staff of the
hospital or for clinical privileges at the hospital and every two years thereafter).
14. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.13(a) (2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b) (2000)) (restricting
access to the NPDB to those entities listed in the regulations); see also Department of Health
and Human Services, General Public, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/genpublic.html (stating that
the law prohibits disclosure of information about a specific physician to the general public) (last
visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
15. The Department of Health and Human Services does publish a quantitative
summary-available to the public-of the number of medical malpractice reports; licensure,
clinical privileges, and professional society membership reports; and Medicare/Medicaid
exclusion reports submitted to the NPDB per state. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
NPDB SUMMARY REPORT (2005), available at http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/pubs/stats/
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Association (AMA) maintains a database of physician demographic and
professional information, such as the physician's educational background,
certification, and office locations. 16 The AMA database contains no negative
physician information, however, corresponding with the organization's
vehement opposition to opening the NPDB to the general public. 17 Several
private, commercial sites disseminate information about individual physicians.
For example, Health Grades, Inc. allows patients to purchase physician reports,
which include any government disciplinary action taken within the past five
years. 1 8 Similarly, ChoiceTrust advertises physician reports, available for
consumer purchase, that include credentialing information such as licensure
actions, dismissals, and sanctions.' 9
Traditionally, the regulation of health, safety, and general welfare has been
a power of the states.2° While every state's board of medicine maintains a
website listing its licensed physicians2' and most state websites list disciplinary
information taken against individual physicians, only a portion of the states
provide an easily searchable database of such information that the general
NPDB_- SummaryReport.pdf. The most recent data covers the time period from September 1,
1990, through September 2, 2005, and does not contain any information on individual
physicians. Id.
16. See American Medical Association, AMA Physician Select, http://webapps.ama-
assn.org/doctorfinder/disclaimer.jsp (requiring patients to read a disclaimer-"AMA shall not be
liable to you or others for any decision made or action taken by you in reliance on the
information obtained from this site"-before searching the database of physician information)
(last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See American Medical Association, Policy Finder: H-355.985, http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf new/pf-online (stating that the AMA "opposes all efforts to open the National
Practitioner Data Bank to public access" and "strongly opposes public access to medical
malpractice payment information in the National Practitioner Data Bank") (last visited Nov. 29,
2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. See Health Grades, Inc., www.healthgrades.com (leading patients to a searchable
database, but requiring users to visit a page explaining how to interpret the physician
information before displaying the search results) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See ChoicePoint Asset Co., ChoiceTrust, www.choicetrust.com (leading consumers to
a searchable database) (last visited Nov. 29, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
20. See Kevin Outterson, Health Care, Technology and Federalism, 103 W. VA. L. REv.
503,504 (2001) ("The regulation of health care has traditionally been the province of the states,
most often grounded in the police power.").
21. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (noting that a reason for creating the NPDB
was the concern that a physician could just move to a different state and start his or her career
from scratch-without anyone knowing-after receiving disciplinary action or a negative
medical malpractice outcome in a state).
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public can use.22 Furthermore, not all states have made medical malpractice
information available to the public on the Internet.23 Massachusetts was the
first state to provide the public with a searchable database of physician
information-including medical malpractice and disciplinary data with
appropriate explanatory information-on the Internet and remains one of only a
few states providing such a service today.24 Medical malpractice judgments
and criminal convictions, however, are generally available as a matter of public
record.25 Thus, the general public currently has access to a scattered series of
databases of physician information, none of which rival the efficiency or
completeness of the NPDB.
C. Failed Federal Legislative Attempts to Grant Public
Access to Databases
As the NPDB is an efficient source of valuable physician information,
several attempts have been made at the federal level to open access to the
NPDB to the general public. Each attempt has failed. Under the Health
Security Act proposed in 1993, an individual seeking to enroll in a health plan
would have been able to access the NPDB profiles of the practitioners
participating in the health plan. 6 The bill died in committee.27 Under the
22. See JOHN PAUL FAWCETr Er AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, SURVEY OF DOCTOR DIsCIPLINARY
INFORMATION ON STATE WEB SrrEs, http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7168
(grading the user-friendliness and content of each state's board of medicine website based on an
April 3, 2002 survey) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Public Citizen, a national non-profit public interest organization, recommends that
each state maintain a publicly accessible, easily searchable database of physician information,
including disciplinary data and medical malpractice information. Id.
23. Id. (noting that the California, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, and Tennessee boards
do provide medical malpractice information).
24. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Physician Profile Search, http://profiles.
massmedboard.org/Profiles/MA-Physician-Profile-Find-Doctor.asp (providing a searchable
database of physician information, which includes explanations of how to properly interpret the
data) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
25. See National Center for State Courts, Public Access to Court Records,
www.courtaccess.org (providing links to each state's court system) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Medical malpractice settlements, however,
generally are not available in judicial records.
26. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. § 5005(d)(1) (1994), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
home/billsres.html.
27. See The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 103d Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/103search.html (listing the last congressional action on the bill as in
the Post Office and Civil Service Committee on October 7, 1994) (last visited Dec. 4,2005) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Health Care Quality Improvement Act Amendments proposed in 1994,
information in the NPDB-with the exception of certain physician personal
information, such as home address and Social Security number, and patient
identifying information-would have been available to the public." This bill
29also died in committee. Under the Health Care Liability Reform and Quality
Assurance Act proposed in 1995, an individual would have been able to request
and receive information from the NPDB. 30 The section of the bill granting
public access to the NPDB was struck, and the bill did not pass.31 The Health
Care Quality Improvement Act Amendments of 1996 would have provided
limited public access to information in the NPDB via the Internet.32 More
specifically, only information involving claims of over $25,000 would have
been available and patient identifying information and certain physician
personal information would not have been available.33 This bill died in
committee as well.34
The most recent federal attempt to grant public access to the NPDB was
the Patient Protection Act of 2000.35 The Patient Protection Act of 2000 would
have provided public access to information in the NPDB-with the exception
of patient identifying information and certain personal information of the
physician-via the Internet.36 The Patient Protection Act of 2000 also would
have provided additional information to help the public put medical malpractice
claims in their proper context: (1) a comparison of the information in a
physician's profile to the experiences of other physicians in the same specialty
in the same state; (2) a statement explaining that physicians who work with
28. H.R. 4274, 103d Cong. § 6(c) (1994), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/103
search.html.
29. See The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 103d Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/103search.htm (listing the last congressional action on the bill as
referral to the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment on May 16, 1994) (last visited
Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. S. 454, 104th Cong. § 203 (1995), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills-
res.html.
31. See id. (listing § 203 as "struck out").
32. S. 2004, 104th Cong. § 8(c) (1996), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills-
res.html.
33. Id.
34. See The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/104search.html (listing the last congressional action on the bill as
referral to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources on July 31, 1996) (last visited Dec. 4,
2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
35. H.R. 5122, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills-
res.html.
36. Id. at § 101(a).
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high-risk patients are likely to have higher numbers of medical malpractice
claims; (3) a statement that certain specialties are more likely to be the subject
of litigation; and (4) a statement that "a payment made pursuant to a medical
malpractice action or claim may occur for a variety of reasons which do not
necessarily reflect negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the
physician."'37 Furthermore, the Patient Protection Act of 2000 would have
allowed practitioners to submit an explanation of an incident in the NPDB,
which would also have been distributed to the public.38 Like its predecessors,
however, this bill died in committee.39
11. Arguments Against Public Access to Physician Information
The vast majority of scholarship addressing the NPDB, especially in the
wake of the 1999 IOM Report, 40 argues that the general public should not have
37. id.
38. Id.; id. at § 205.
39. See The Library of Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/106search.html (listing the last congressional action on the bill as
referral to the House Committee on Commerce on September 7, 2000) (last visited Dec. 4,
2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-14 (listing the full IOM recommendations). A
summary of the full recommendations follows:
Recommendation 4.1: Congress should create a Center for Patient Safety to set and
monitor the progress of national goals for patient safety and coordinate medical
error research.
Recommendation 5.1: Congress should establish a standardized mandatory system
for all health care organizations to report adverse events that result in harm or
death, including providing a mechanism for analyzing the error reports and
identifying persistent patient safety problems.
Recommendation 5.2: Encourage development of voluntary, confidential error
reporting systems to focus on threats to patient safety rather than past errors.
Recommendation 6.1: Congress should extend peer review protections to patient
safety and quality improvement data to encourage error reporting.
Recommendation 7.1: Regulatory standards and consumer expectations for health
care organizations should focus greater attention on patient safety.
Recommendation 7.2: The performance standards and expectations set by health
professional licensing bodies and societies should focus greater attention on patient
safety, including disseminating information on patient safety, setting safety
standards, encouraging error reporting, and establishing methods to identify unsafe
practitioners.
Recommendation 7.3: The FDA should increase the attention paid to the safe use
of drugs through its pre- and post-marketing processes.
Recommendation 8.1: Health care organizations and professionals should make
improving patient safety a declared and serious aim by establishing patient safety
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access to the physician information in the databank. Arguments against public
access to the NPDB fall into categories such as operational concerns, reliability
concerns, and unintended consequences.4' Most importantly, much of the
scholarship indicates that error reporting is critical to improving patient safety
and links public access to the information in the NPDB with decreased error
42reporting.
A. Operational Concerns and Reliability
General concerns with allowing the public to access the NPDB include
guaranteeing the accuracy of information in the database, ascertaining the
necessary scope of information to be included in the database, and covering the
operational costs of maintaining an accurate, up-to-date database.43 Some
scholars argue that the costs of maintaining a database accessible to the public
are not justified in light of the availability of physician information from other
sources.
44
Concerns with reliability focus on whether the information in the database
will adequately predict physician competency for consumers. Studies have
suggested that medical malpractice claims may not correlate with physician
programs and developing a culture of safety.
Recommendation 8.2: Health care organizations should universally implement
proven medication safety practices.
Id.
41. Mark J. Greenwood, The Physician Profile Database: Publishing Malpractice
Information on the Internet, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 477, 509 (2000) (categorizing the arguments
against public access to databases of healthcare provider information). Interestingly, Dr.
Greenwood-who is a flight physician, attending emergency room physician, and attorney-
argues that physicians should concede to allowing the dissemination of information to the public
and focus, instead, on assuring that the information disseminated is correct. Id. at 536.
42. See Jason M. Healy et al., Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care
Information, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 595, 596 (2002) (asserting that "quality experts almost
universally agree that an important predicate to quality improvement is for providers themselves
to identify medical errors and other quality problems").
43. See Greenwood, supra note 41, at 509-11 (describing general concerns with allowing
the public to access physician profiles). Consumer access to both negative information, such as
criminal convictions, and positive information, such as physicians' professional achievements,
should allow consumers to make informed identifications of the best and worst choices among a
group of physicians. Id. at 510.
44. See Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time for Lawyer Profiles?, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 645,
668-69 (2001) (noting that disciplinary actions by state medical boards, the criminal records of
physicians, and medical malpractice judgments are matters of public records, and several
groups already collect and disseminate information about physicians).
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competence,45 yet scholars note that consumers seriously consider such
46information, if given the opportunity, when selecting a physician. In addition,
the usefulness of the information in the database to consumers depends on the
accuracy and timeliness of the information,47 which would place a huge burden
on the administrators of a publicly accessible system to keep the database
updated. Thus, some scholars suggest that allowing the public to access
negative physician information would mislead, rather than enlighten, the typical
consumer who is not familiar with the frequency and the significance of
medical malpractice claims and disciplinary sanctions. 48 In other words, less
information is better than misinterpreted information.
B. Unintended Consequences
Scholars also suggest several possible unintended consequences to
granting the public access to physician databases. 49 For example, public access
to physician databases may limit the availability of medical procedures and
experimental treatments, as the threat of disseminating negative information
may deter physicians from performing certain high-risk procedures that are
more likely to tarnish a physician's record with a negative outcome and
provoke expensive litigation.5° Scholars also argue that public access to the
NPDB might encourage litigation, as a physician whose public reputation is at
stake would have a greater incentive not to settle a claim, and lawyers,
theoretically, could use the data bank to identify problem doctors as defendants
45. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1967 (1996)
(concluding that the severity of the patient's disability, not the physician's negligence,
determines a plaintiffs malpractice award); see also supra note 4 (referring to the Harvard
Medical Practice Study-a source of the IOM Report statistics-co-authored by Troyen
Brennan).
46. See Greenwood, supra note 41, at 511-14 (describing concerns with reliability).
Negative media attention to sensational medical malpractices cases may explain consumer
reliance on negative physician information. Id. at 521-23. However, consumer reliance on
such negative information may make informed decisions even more difficult. Id. at 523-26.
47. Berenson, supra note 44, at 669-70.
48. Id. at 664-65.
49. See Greenwood, supra note 41, at 514 (identifying unintended consequences such as
limiting access to physicians, inappropriate use of the database, increases in healthcare costs due
to the cost of physicians defending themselves against adverse actions, decreases in peer
reporting, and infringement of consumer privacy).
50. See id. at 516 (suggesting that physicians will avoid a negative databank profile and
litigation by avoiding complex procedures).
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in lawsuits. 51 Furthermore, the more time a physician spends in court, the less
52time the physician has to spend with patients. Thus, many scholars conclude
that, in light of concerns of healthcare access, the dissemination of physician
information to the general public should be discouraged.
C. Facilitating Error Reporting
53
Many health law scholars have focused on the need to improve error
reporting in the healthcare system in order to enhance the quality of available
healthcare services, including physician competency. 54 Some scholars describe
the argument that malpractice liability precludes adequate attention to patient
safety issues by discouraging error reporting as "an article of faith" in the
healthcare sector.5 5  In the first place, a physician's good business sense
precludes reporting errors--either the physician's own errors or the errors of a
colleague-if consumers will use such information either to select a physician
56
or to bolster medical malpractice claims against physicians. 57 Such behavior on
51. See Berenson, supra note 44, at 666 (suggesting that a consequence of public access
to physician profiles would be increased litigation).
52. Id. at 666-67; Greenwood, supra note 41, at 514, 516 (noting that a "cost" of
defending medical malpractice suits resulting from public access to negative physician
information is time spent away from patients in court).
53. The IOM Report notes that the terminology for discussing medical error is not firmly
established, but provides specific definitions for the terms used in the Report. IOM REPORT,
supra note 3, at 49-65. According to the IOM, a system is "a set of interdependent elements
interacting to achieve a common aim. The elements may be both human and non-human
(equipment, technologies, etc.)." Id. at 52. An accident is "an event that involves damage to a
defined system that disrupts the ongoing or future output of that system." Id. Error is "the
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (e.g., error of execution) or the use of a
wrong plan to achieve an aim (e.g., error of planning)." Id. at 53. Safety is "freedom from
accidental injury." Id. at 58.
54. See Healy et al., supra note 42, at 612-13 (noting that peer review improves patient
safety by evaluating practicing physicians' quality of care); see also Bryan A. Liang, Promoting
Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient,
Physician, and Attorney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541, 564 (2000) [hereinafter Liang, Promoting
Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error] (recommending changes to the medical error
reporting systems to improve patient safety).
55. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.:
Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 893,
910(2005).
56. See Greenwood, supra note 41, at 519 (describing factors that deter physician error
reporting).
57. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 909-14 (noting the prominent physicians,
scholars, and individuals at the AMA who agree with the conventional wisdom that medical
malpractice liability precludes improving patient safety).
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the part of physicians would undermine the very reason for granting access to
the database, as the database would not contain profiles that accurately reflect
physician competence. The IOM Report and many scholars focus on the need
to move from blaming individuals for medical error to understanding and
preventing error, and conclude that physician information should be kept
confidential.58
1. Medical Errors and Error Reporting: The Need for Confidentiality
The healthcare industry, a complex system59 characterized by
specialization and interdependency of its component factors, 60 will never be
able to rid itself of errors entirely, however, as errors-especially human
errors-in complex systems are inevitable.6' In addition, errors in the
healthcare industry are difficult to measure, as one patient might survive
deplorable medical care, while another patient might die from the best medical
care available.62 Yet, analysis of medical error-covering mistakes that cause
injury and mistakes that do not cause injury, but excluding purposeful or
reckless actions or the underlying patient illness-is crucial.6 3 Scholar Bryan
Liang M.D., J.D., Ph.D., stresses the special importance of studying errors that
do not result in patient injury, noting that "those mistakes lay latent in the
system, increasing the probability that there will be patient injury in the future
associated with this same mistake. ''64 In other words, ignoring these hidden
errors will "[make] the system more prone to future failure.,
65
58. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 49 (noting that the problem in healthcare is not bad
people, but rather a system that needs to be made safer).
59. See id. at 60 (suggesting that healthcare is a complex system).
60. See id. at 58-59 (describing the characteristics of a complex system).
61. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 948 (noting the "frailties that afflict human
behavior-including sensory limitations, flawed decision heuristics and empirical theories,
information overload, emotions and other distractions, fatigue and other physical problems,
defective motivations, training limitations, and forces beyond human control").
62. See id. at 949-50 (noting that patients who die for no apparent reason and patients
who survive against all odds may mask errors).
63. See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note
54, at 542 (defining medical error as "a mistake, inadvertent occurrence, or unintended event in
a health care delivery which may, or may not, result in patient injury"); see also IOM REPORT,
supra note 3, at 29 (defining an "adverse event" as "an injury caused by medical management
rather than by the underlying disease or condition of the patient").
64. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note 54, at
542.
65. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 56.
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In light of the need to deter preventable medical errors, the IOM Report
recognized the importance of both mandatory and voluntary error reporting
systems in medicine.66 Mandatory reporting systems focus on errors
associated with serious injury or death, and reports may prompt
investigations that lead to sanctioning wrongdoers.67  Mandatory systems
improve patient safety by addressing at least the most serious errors and
requiring healthcare organizations to make at least minimal investments in
68patient safety to avoid sanctions and public exposure. Voluntary reporting
systems, on the other hand, strive to improve safety by focusing on errors that
result in little or no harm.69 Voluntary systems of error reporting improve
patient safety by addressing infrequent errors and patterns of errors.70
Scholars have identified several problems with both mandatory and
voluntary error reporting systems: (1) medical error is common,7 ' (2) the
healthcare system has not recognized the complex system's nature of medical
error, (3) risk management does not promote patient safety and reduce
medical error,72 and (4) the legal system does not decrease the risk of patient
66. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 87 (stressing the need to analyze, not just compile,
the information received by either type of system). According to the IOM Report, reporting
systems in general improve patient safety by gathering information from multiple sources to
understand the various factors that contribute to errors, by distributing information to create
awareness of recurring safety problems, and by analyzing larger numbers of "rare" errors to
better identify trends of safety problems and unusual problems. Id. at 98.
67. See id. at 86 (describing mandatory reporting systems as those in which the primary
purpose is to hold providers accountable).
68. Id. At least one-third of the states have mandatory reporting systems. Id. at 91.
69. See id. at 87 (describing voluntary reporting systems).
70. Id. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO),
the organization responsible for hospital accreditations, maintains a sentinel event database. See
id. at 93-94 (defining a sentinel event as an unexpected occurrence involving the risk of death
or serious physical or psychological injury and classifying the sentinel event program as a
voluntary reporting system). Under the JCAHO sentinel event program, hospitals are required
to conduct an investigation to discover the cause of certain sentinel events-unanticipated death
or serious injury unrelated to the natural course of the patient's condition, patient suicide in a
supervised environment, patient abduction or inappropriate discharge, erroneous use of
incompatible blood products, and surgery on the wrong patient or body part-and submit the
report to JCAHO, either voluntarily or at the Joint Commission's request. Id. The
investigations are kept confidential, but unacceptable reports put the hospital's accreditation at
risk. Id.
71. See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note
54, at 554 (citing the statistic that 98,000 patients die from medical error each year); see also
IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 26 (asserting that at least 44,000 and possibly as many as 98,000
patients die from medical error each year).
72. See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note
54, at 546 (giving examples of "risk management," such as educating doctors about the medical
malpractice system and clinical techniques and establishing clinical practice guidelines). Liang
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injury.73 Scholars suggest that certain impediments to reporting medical errors
must be removed in order for the healthcare industry to adequately understand
and, therefore, be in a position to address the underlying sources of the medical
error problem.74 In particular, physicians are discouraged from reporting errors
because patients may use such reports against the physician in a medical
malpractice lawsuit and an HMO or healthcare plan may use them to terminate
the physician's contract.75  Thus, scholars suggest that creating stricter
discovery protections, 76 eliminating termination-without-cause provisions in
physician contracts,77 creating independent third-party review groups,78 and
reserving the tort litigation system for intentional injuries and reckless actions
79
will remove basic financial disincentives to error reporting. 80 The Institute of
notes that the current system of risk management does not adequately promote patient safety and
reduce medical error because doctors still do not understand the legal standards of medical
malpractice, are unable to predict jury verdict outcomes, and do not agree on the clinical
standards for appropriate medical care. Id. at 547-48.
73. Id. at 554. In fact, Liang's research casts doubt on the entire medical malpractice
system as a deterrent to inferior healthcare delivery. See Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical
Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 121, 145-47 (1997) (describing a small study of an anesthesiology department that
suggests a system of medical malpractice liability in which physicians do not understand the
legal standards and are unable to accurately predict the outcome of jury verdicts likely does not
deter the delivery of inferior healthcare).
74. See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note
54, at 563-67 (emphasizing the importance of physicians reporting errors).
75. See id. at 555-61 (describing disincentives to reporting error information); see also
Berenson, supra note 44, at 660 (noting that the impact of sanctions on a medical practice also
deters physicians' effective peer review of their colleagues).
76. See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note
54, at 564 (arguing the need for federal legislation to protect safety and error information from
legal discovery). Traditional protections against the discovery of information, such as the peer
review privilege and the attorney-client privilege, usually fail in the medical malpractice
context. Id. at 555-59. Liang notes that "[plunishment only deters the provider from doing
anything; it doesn't correct the latent errors in the system." Id. at 564.
77. Id. at 565 (suggesting termination-without-cause provisions discourage physician
participation in error reporting systems). Such contracts likely deter participation by
encouraging the physician to cover mistakes, rather than report them, in order to maintain
employment.
78. See id. at 566 (arguing the need for independent third-party review groups to separate
financial decisionmaking from clinical decisions regarding patient safety and ways to reduce
medical error).
79. Id. at 567 (noting that medical errors do not include intentional injuries or reckless
behavior, so litigation for such actions would not preclude error reporting).
80. See id. at 555 (noting that "accepting reality, without protections, no one is going to
report because no one likes being sued"); see also id. at 560 (noting that no physician actually
would be "so brazen as to ignore [his or her] financial lifeline" and risk termination by admitting
error, especially if "[the physician has] a family to feed; [has] kids in college; [has] a set of
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Medicine strongly agrees that liability discourages error reporting and also
recommends strengthening the practical81 and legal protections afforded to the
individuals who make error reports, to the individuals who receive and handle
error reports, and to the information contained in the error reports.82 In light of
the varying protections that state evidentiary rules and peer review statutes
afford, the 10M Report suggests that Congress should enact federal protective
legislation to protect error information.83 While scholars recognize that patients
have an important role in encouraging safety and reducing medical error,84 their
recommendations strongly suggest keeping error information within the
healthcare system. Similarly, in order to balance the public's right to
understand safety concerns in the healthcare industry with providers' desire to
maintain confidentiality and protection from liability, the 10M Report
recommends mandatory reporting and public disclosure of only the most
serious errors in the healthcare system and confidential, voluntary reporting for
more minor injuries and near misses.85
2. The Ideal: A Comparison to Aviation
Aviation has been cited as the "classic" example of an industry that has
achieved a higher standard of consumer safety by recognizing the complex
system's nature of flight errors and taking the appropriate steps to successfully
86reduce error within the system. Liang notes that the 98,000 deaths from
medical error each year equates to 270 deaths per day, which would be
parents in a nursing home; or [has] patients relying on [him or her]").
81. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 124 (describing practical protections to the
information in error reports as promises of confidentiality and anonymous or de-identified error
reporting).
82. See id. at 127 (noting that protection of all three components of error reporting
systems-the reporter, the recipient, and the substantive information-is necessary).
83. See id. at 127-28 (noting the immediate and uniform impact such legislation could
have on the healthcare industry). The IOM Report notes that the information in the National
Practitioner Data Bank is protected from discovery in lawsuits. Id. at 122. The IOM Report
also notes the federal protection afforded by the HCQIA to good faith peer review participants.
Id. at 121.
84. See Liang, Protecting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note 54,
at 566 (suggesting that patients have the greatest incentive to learn about the healthcare system,
report potential patient safety concerns, and encourage legislatures to act).
85. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 101-02.
86. See, e.g., Liang, Protecting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra
note 54, at 543-45 (comparing medicine to aviation-"the classic example" of reducing error
within a complex system).
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comparable to more than one 757 airplane crashing and killing each
passenger on board every day each year in the airline industry.87 While
accidents are ,likely to occur at some point in any complex system,88 the
commercial airline industry has had years in which no deaths have occurred.89
The IOM Report indicates that characteristics of a highly reliable industry,
such as aviation, include: an organizational commitment to safety, high
levels of redundancy in personnel and safety measures, and a culture that
demands learning and willingness to change. 9° While some deaths in the
healthcare industry are inevitable as the result of old age or incurable disease,
scholars argue that conformity with the airline industry's model may help to
reduce deaths by medical error.
More specifically, the airline industry recognizes that the pilot is not
exclusively responsible for the safety of a flight. Rather, the pilot, flight
attendants, ground crew, maintenance crew, and air traffic controllers form a
team, and each member of the team contributes to the outcome of a flight.91
The key feature of the airline industry's error reporting system is its dual
nature: certain error reports go to an independent and neutral third party
rather than to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which can
sanction pilots. 92 The third party, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), maintains the Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS). 93 Individuals anonymously submit incident reports to the ASRS. 94
NASA solicits follow-up reports, removes identifying information from the
87. Id. at 543.
88. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 57.
89. Liang, Protecting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note 54, at
545.
90. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 57. Like the healthcare industry, aviation is an
extremely complex system of interdependent and often unpredictable components. For
example, the sequences of activities on an aircraft carrier vary depending on weather and
visibility, sea conditions, time of day, and flight schedules. Both industries require a strong
emphasis on safety--especially in the use of hazardous technology-to run efficiently. See id.
at 162 (comparing the aviation and healthcare industries).
91. See Liang, Protecting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note 54,
at 544 (describing the team approach in the airline industry).
92. See id. at 561-62 (describing the airline industry's error reporting system).
93. See Aviation Safety Reporting System, Program Overview, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/
overview nf.htm (stating that NASA operates the ASRS through an independent contractor
selected via competitive bidding) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
94. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 95-96 (defining an incident as "an occurrence
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of operations"
and distinguishing an incident from an accident).
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reports, analyzes the information, and distributes the results.95 In order to
remain a neutral third party, NASA does not suggest solutions to the
recurring problems the agency identifies. 96 Again, the ASRS operates
independently of the FAA, and NASA has no regulatory or sanctioning
powers.97 Without the threat of punishment, pilots feel more comfortable
submitting errors or hazards to the ASRS. Furthermore, the appropriate
organization can address reported issues, making the airline industry safer.
The FAA also oversees the National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center
(NASDAC), which disseminates safety and error information, another
important feature of the relatively safe airline industry.98
IV. Arguments For Public Access to Physician Information
The general public currently has scattered access to incomplete
physician information via state websites, commercial websites, and court
records. None of these sources of information rival the efficiency or
completeness of the information in the NPDB. Allowing the public access to
pertinent information in the NPDB-via modifying the HCQIA-would
benefit the general public by giving consumers more information to make
better-informed choices when selecting healthcare practitioners. While many
of the arguments in support of granting public access to the information in
the NPDB fall within the context of consumerism, some scholars have also
questioned the accuracy of the more traditional arguments-namely the
necessity of confidential error reporting-against allowing the public to
access the information.
95. See Liang, Protecting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error, supra note 54,
at 561-62 (describing NASA's role as an independent third party in the airline industry's error
reporting system); see also IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 71-73 (commending aviation's
recognition of the need to expand and disseminate safety knowledge and suggesting the need for
a similar approach in the healthcare industry).
96. See IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 96-97 (noting that NASA investigates reported
incidents and issues safety alerts to the airline industry and the FAA as needed).
97. See id. at 96 (noting that the programs are operated independently due to pilot
reluctance to report accidents to the FAA, which does have regulatory authority).
98. See Federal Aviation Administration, The National Aviation Safety Data Analysis
Center, www.nasdac.faa.gov (classifying the NASDAC as "a facility for the integration and
analysis of aviation safety data") (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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A. Public Access to Healthcare Information Is a Natural Consequence of
the Commercialization of Healthcare
With the strong commercialization of healthcare and the variety of medical
practitioner choices available to individual consumers and to members of
HMOs and healthcare plans, more information would lead to better-informed
decisions.99 A medical practitioner sells a product-healthcare services-to the
public. Quantifiable and comparable characteristics of that service include the
practitioner's educational background, achievements, and negative outcomes.
The NPDB is a centrally compiled, easily accessible source of such product
characteristics.
1. Focus on Consumerism
One author identified "consumerism" as a "buzzword" of the healthcare
industry in 2004. 1°° She noted that a healthcare consumer has both a positive
definition-a more informed patient-and a negative definition-a patient who
has to pay more out-of-pocket to cover the host of healthcare services.101 In its
1999 report, the Institute of Medicine had identified two categories of factors
that can influence the quality of medical care: (1) regulation and legislation
and (2) economic incentives. 102  According to the IOM Report, market
incentives direct the values and priorities of healthcare organizations. 13 In fact,
despite recommending that negative physician information be kept confidential,
the IOM Report specifically discusses the emergence of comparative
performance data, available to the public "to assist purchasers and consumers in
identifying high quality providers."'104 In addition, some states-Massachusetts,
for example-have also recognized the importance of allowing consumers to
99. Although the purchase of healthcare services may be distinguished from the purchase
of material items, consider the large amount of research many consumers conduct when making
other significant purchases, such as the purchase of a car, appliance, electronic device, or pet.
100. See Laura Stokowski, Trends in Nursing: 2004 and Beyond, Topics IN ADvANCED
PRAC. NURSING EJOURNAL (January 13, 2004), www.medscape.con/viewarticle/466711_1
(identifying trend number six as healthcare consumerism and "e-health") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. Id.
102. IOM REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 20 (noting the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) of
the National Committee for Quality Assurance and the Consumer Assessment of Health Plans
(CAHPs) survey from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality).
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make informed choices and, therefore, disseminate physician information.1
l 5
The commercialization of healthcare has become a reality, a reality that
Congress should address by providing consumers with more information to
make informed choices.
2. A Parallel to Commercial Free Speech
With such a focus on consumerism in the healthcare industry, any
information about the product sold-the characteristics of healthcare services
and providers -might qualify as commercial speech. As the NPDB contains
information about the quality of healthcare providers, the information itself
might constitute commercial speech and, as such, receive constitutional
protections. Constitutionally protected speech should not be suppressed;
therefore, Congress should revise the HCQIA to allow the general public to
access pertinent physician information in the NPDB.
a. Commercial Free Speech Generally
In the watershed case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,1°6 the U.S. Supreme Court decided that
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (naming Massachusetts as the first state to
provide the public with standardized physician profiles).
106. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976). In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court considered whether the First
Amendment protects commercial speech. Id. at 760-61. The Virginia statute in dispute stated
that any pharmacist who "publish[ed], advertis[ed], or promot[ed], directly or indirectly, in any
manner whatsoever any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms... for any
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription" would be guilty of unprofessional conduct.
Id. at 749-50. Essentially, the statute prohibited pharmacists from advertising drug prices. Id.
at 752. Prescription drug consumers, not the pharmacists subject to the regulation, brought the
suit arguing that the First Amendment entitled them to information about drug prices. Id. at
753-54. The Court recognized important individual and societal interests in advertising
prescription drug prices, namely providing money-conscious consumers with information to
choose inexpensive drugs and disseminating information to allow consumers to make well-
informed decisions. Id. at 763-65. The Court also recognized the strong competing
justifications for banning prescription drug advertising, especially maintaining the professional
nature of the pharmaceutical business and of the pharmaceutical profession. Id. at 766-68. The
Court noted, however, that the government's justifications boiled down to protecting consumers
from the potential dangers of advertising by keeping them in ignorance. Id. at 769. The Court
emphasized that the First Amendment does not allow a choice "between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available"-instead,
information may not be suppressed. Id. at 770. The Court concluded that the First Amendment
protects commercial speech-especially commercial speech that is not false or misleading and
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commercial speech merits First Amendment protection.It7 In fact, the Court in
that case decided that a statute that perpetuated consumer ignorance in
healthcare was unconstitutional. 10 8 Subsequent Supreme Court cases refined
the commercial speech protection, including further applications of the
protection in the healthcare industry. In Carey v. Population Services
International,109 the Court decided that a contraceptive company had standing
to bring suit on behalf of its potential customers and determined that a New
York statute completely banning the advertisement of contraceptives violated
the First Amendment.' 10 Assuming, for the moment, that the NPDB qualifies
as commercial speech, healthcare consumers would have standing to bring a
suit challenging federal restrictions on the dissemination of physician
information much like the prescription drug consumers in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy.
More specifically, the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy suggested that "[i]f there is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal
right to receive the advertising. The Court in that case emphasized that a
not advertising illegal activity-and affirmed the district court's judgment enjoining the
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy from enforcing the statute in question. Id. at 771-73.
107. See id. at 773 (holding that commercial speech merits First Amendment protection).
108. See id. (striking down a Virginia law that prevented informed consumer
decisionmaking).
109. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). In Carey, the Court considered
the constitutionality under the First Amendment of a New York statute that criminalized the
distribution of contraceptives to minors, the sale of contraceptives by anyone other than a
licensed pharmacist, and the advertisement or display of contraceptives. Id. at 681-82. The
Court first determined that a contraceptive company had standing to bring suit for itself and on
behalf of potential customers who seek access to their product. Id. at 683-84. With respect to
the restriction on advertising, the Court held the restriction violated the First Amendment. Id. at
701-02. The Court protected the dissemination of information about the availability and price
of contraceptives by citing its decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, which held that a
State cannot "completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity" just because the information could be categorized as commercial
speech. Id. at 700. The Court noted that the New York statute did not prohibit only misleading
or deceptive advertisements or the advertisements of illegal activity. Id. In fact, the Court noted
that the subject of the advertisements-contraception--constituted a zone of personal privacy
protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Id. at 684-85. The Court also
acknowledged the "'substantial individual and societal interests' in the free flow of commercial
information" emphasized in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. Id. at 700. Finally, the Court
discredited each justification for the restriction suggested by the State, namely to protect the
public from offensive or embarrassing advertisements and to prevent legitimizing illicit sexual
behavior. Id. at 701-02.
110. See id. at 683-84 (holding company had standing to bring suit); id. at 701-02
(holding New York statute unconstitutional for completely banning the advertisement of
contraceptives).
111. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,757
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public policy interest in allowing money-conscious consumers to choose
inexpensive prescription drugs favored advertising drug prices." 2 The Court
stated:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate. [Prescription drug
consumers'] case in this respect is a convincing one. Those whom the
suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are the
poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate amount of
their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the least
able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their
scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as they
do, information as to who is charging what becomes more than a
convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the
enjoyment of basic necessities." 3
This public interest rationale logically applies to healthcare services, including
selecting a competent physician. Healthcare services, like drug prices, are
expensive and vary greatly. Consumers have a strong interest in comparing the
quality and prices of healthcare services so as to spend their money wisely,' "
4
creating an argument for standing in a case to gain access to more information
about various healthcare options.
Furthermore, the Court in Virginia State Board ofPharmacy emphasized
a strong public interest in making well-informed decisions:
(1976).
112. Id. at 764-65.
113. Id. at 763-64.
114. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that Massachusetts was the first
state to make standardized physician profiles available to consumers on the Internet).
Massachusetts explains: "The 'Physician Profiles' program is one tool patients can use to make
the right health care decisions." Id.; see also Frances H. Miller, Illuminating Patient Choice
Releasing Physician-Specific Data to the Public, 8 Lov. CONSUMER L. REv. 125, 126 (1996)
(suggesting that competition in any market depends on price and quality). More specifically,
customers purchase goods or services at the price and quality combination that will suit their
needs and preferences. Id. Professor Miller argues that in the market for healthcare services,
health insurance eliminates price from consumers' purchasing considerations. Id. Thus,
consumers must use quality comparisons to determine appropriate healthcare services. Id.
However, as Professor Miller notes, "patients must possess sufficient factual information to
impart some measure of meaning to their choices if their decisions are to constitute anything
more than a charade." Id.; see also Melissa Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a
Workable Reporting System, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 386-87 (2001) (noting that healthcare
entities could compete by improving the quality of healthcare services if consumers had accurate
and sufficient quality data).
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So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the
allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those
decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable." 5
The public interest in making well-informed decisions is most pertinent in
healthcare. Any reasonable patient would want to make a well-informed
decision when choosing a physician, as patients often follow the advice of
physicians without question. A sensible patient would want to assess a
physician's malpractice history before surrendering his or her health, well-
being, and money carte blanche 16 and would have standing under this line of
case law to do so.
b. The Central Hudson Test
The argument for consumer standing to bring suit assumed that the
information in the NPDB could be classified as commercial speech. But,
would it? In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York,' ' 7 the Supreme Court fine-tuned its commercial
115. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,765
(1976) (citation omitted).
116. See Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 395, 444-45 (2004) (distinguishing a patient's blind
faith in a physician from a patient's rational trust in medicine and concluding that the latter
mindset should be embraced by lawmakers in light of "the realities of our market-based health
care delivery system").
117. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980). In Central Hudson, the Court considered the constitutionality under the First
Amendment of a New York Public Service Commission regulation banning promotional
advertising by electric companies. Id. at 558. The Court applied a four-part test, compiled from
commercial speech cases, to the regulation. Id. at 566. First, the Court noted that Commission
conceded that the electric company's promotional advertisements were not inaccurate or relating
to unlawful activity. Id. Second, the Court noted the Commission's substantial interests in
energy conservation and assuring the availability of fair and efficient electricity rates. Id. at
568-69. Third, the Court determined that the restriction on promotional advertising would not
directly advance the government's interest in the availability of fair and efficient electricity rates
because the restriction was too tenuously linked to Central Hudson's rate structure. Id. at 569.
However, the Court determined that the restriction would directly advance the government's
interest in energy conservation because of the direct connection between advertising and
demand. Id. Fourth, the Court determined that the government's important energy conservation
interest did not justify a complete ban on promotional advertising because the ban precluded
Central Hudson from advertising services that would divert energy demand to more efficient
sources and the Commission failed to demonstrate that restrictions on the advertisements'
content would not serve the energy conservation purpose just as well as the complete ban. Id. at
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speech analysis and developed a four-part test for determining whether the
restrictions on commercial speech are constitutional: (1) the speech concerns
lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) the asserted government interest is
substantial; (3) the regulation directly advances the government interest; and
(4) the regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve the government
interest.
118
In a recent application of the Central Hudson test, the Court in Thompson
v. Western States Medical Center1 9 found a Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA) prohibition on advertising or promoting
particular compounded drugs to be an unconstitutional restriction of
commercial speech under the First Amendment. 120 In assessing the first
Central Hudson factor, the Court in Thompson noted the government's
concession that the advertisements in question would not be about unlawful
activity and would not be misleading. 121 With respect to the second Central
Hudson factor, the Court accepted the government's asserted interests behind
the challenged FDAMA provision-"preserv[ing] the effectiveness and
integrity of the FDCA' s new drug approval process and the protection of the
public health that it provides" and "preserv[ing] the availability of compounded
drugs for those individual patients who, for particularized medical reasons,
cannot use commercially available products that have been approved by the
FDA" 22--as sufficiently compelling. 123  The Court recognized that the
government needed to draw a line between small-scale compounding, a process
570-71. Consequently, the Court decided that the complete ban on promotional advertising
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 571-72.
118. Id. at 566.
119. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). In Thompson, the Court
considered the First Amendment implications of Food and Drug Administration Modernization
Act of 1997 (FDAMA) Section 127(a), which prohibited advertising or promoting particular
compounded drugs. Id. at 360. A group of licensed pharmacists specializing in drug
compounding brought suit to enjoin the advertising restrictions. Id. The Court applied the
Central Hudson analysis and determined that, while the government had sufficiently compelling
interests in preserving the new drug approval process and in preserving the drug compounding
process for individuals who cannot use commercial drugs, the advertising restriction was more
extensive than necessary to meet those interests. Id. at 368-73. The Court noted that the
government failed to consider alternatives for drawing the line between small-scale and large-
scale drug manufacturing (necessary to determine which drugs should be subject to an extensive
approval process) that would be less restrictive on speech. Id. at 371-72. Consequently, the
Court decided that the FDAMA § 127(a) violated the First Amendment. Id. at 377.
120. See id. at 377 (holding FDAMA restriction on pharmaceutical advertising
unconstitutional).
121. Id. at 368.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 369.
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which does not generate enough profit to make a requirement of expensive
safety and efficacy testing feasible, and large-scale drug manufacturing, a
process that does create enough profit to make extensive testing feasible and
necessary, to meet its interests. 124 The Court accepted the government's
argument that the FDAMA provision directly advanced the government's
interest by providing a way to draw that line-through the presence or absence
of advertising-thus meeting the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
125
The FDAMA provision, however, failed the fourth prong of the Central
Hudson test, as the Court determined that the government failed to consider
alternative means for distinguishing between small-scale and large-scale drug
manufacturing that would be less restrictive of speech, such as banning
commercial-scale manufacturing or testing equipment, prohibiting pharmacists
from providing compounded drug products to commercial businesses for sale,
limiting the volume or amount of compounded drugs made or sold, or limiting
compounding to responding to prescriptions. 26 The Court stated that, as a
general rule, "if the Government could achieve its interests in a manner that
does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the Government must do
So1 27 Thompson represents the Court's most recent step in protecting the
direct dissemination of medical information to consumers.
c. Classifying the NPDB as Commercial Speech
Classifying the information in the NPDB as constitutionally protected
commercial speech does not constitute a typical restriction of commercial
speech argument. The Central Hudson test generally applies when a
government regulation prevents a private actor from releasing information to
the public. Here, however, the government both controls the information in the
NPDB and restricts dissemination of that information.1 28 Regardless, the
important policy interest noted in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and
Thompson for classifying information as commercial speech-allowing the
public to assess the information and make intelligent, well-informed
124. Id. at 369-70.
125. See id. at 370-71 (noting the government's argument that pharmacists would not need
to advertise particular products to meet the individual needs of customers who require
compounded drugs, and the advertisement of particular products generally indicates a large-
scale production of that product).
126. See id. at 372 (listing alternative methods for meeting the government's interest in
drawing the line between small-scale and large-scale manufacturing).
127. Id. at 371.
128. Special thanks to Professor Jost for pointing out this subtlety.
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decisions129 -supports the argument that the information in the NPDB is
protected commercial speech or, at least, analogous to commercial speech.
Note that this argument does not suggest that legislative attempts to protect the
privacy of patient information are unconstitutional. Rather, the argument is that
withholding information vital to consumer choice-physician information-is
analogous to restricting commercial speech. Thus, a comparative application of
the Central Hudson test in a hypothetical lawsuit brought by consumers to gain
public access to the NPDB will be informative.
To begin, under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, the information
that the Health Care Quality Information Act requires the healthcare industry to
report to the NPDB, such as physician malpractice information, is not illegal.
In fact, the information is freely available to the public in court documents and
on many state medical board websites.1 30 The government could argue that
physician malpractice information is misleading because ordinary consumers do
not understand the complex, and often frivolous, nature of medical malpractice
litigation and settlements.131 However, such an argument would likely fail, as
the Supreme Court has recognized the public's interest in acquiring information
to make commercial decisions, regardless of the foolishness of the resulting
decision. 132 Moreover, other sources of physician information, such as state or
commercially sponsored websites, explain how to interpret the information
1 33
properly, and the Department of Health and Human Services could easily add
such explanations and caveats to publicly accessible information.
134
129. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366-67 (2002) (referring to the
importance of the availability of information to make intelligent, well-informed decisions
described in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and noting that "the general rule is that the
speaker and the audience, not the government, assess the value of the information presented").
130. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (describing current sources of
physician information available to the public). But see generally Guillermo A. Montero, IfRoth
Were a Doctor: Physician Reputation Under the HCQIA, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 85 (2004)
(arguing that a listing in the NPDB is unconstitutional, as it constitutes a deprivation of a liberty
interest in good reputation without due process).
131. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text (describing the detrimental
consequences of releasing medical malpractice information to consumers who do not know how
to interpret such information).
132. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (noting that "[the
Supreme Court] ha[s] previously rejected the notion that the Government has an interest in
preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of
the public from making bad decisions with the information").
133. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (explaining information available to
the general public, including information available under state law).
134. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (describing the failed Patient
Protection Act of 2000, which would have opened the NPDB to the public and which would
have included provisions to put the information in context: (1) a comparison of the information
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Next, under the second and third prongs of the Central Hudson analysis,
the government does have a compelling interest in encouraging error reporting
and would have a good argument that the NPDB access restriction directly
serves that interest by preserving confidential error reporting. 35 However, the
availability of such information to the public through various other means
would undermine the government's alleged need for strict confidentiality. 13 6 In
addition, most of the arguments for confidentiality simply assume that the
information would be used for medical malpractice litigation 137 without truly
considering the public's legitimate interest in obtaining the information for
comparison purposes.
Moreover, the NPDB public-access restriction would likely fail the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson analysis, as the regulation is more restrictive to
speech than necessary to preserve the government's interest in encouraging
error reporting. For example, rather than drawing the line at access to
physician information, Congress should consider drawing the line at the extent
of access to physician information.1 38 Rather than granting the public complete
access to the current NPDB, Congress should reconsider granting the public
access to centrally compiled positive physician information, such as academic
and professional achievements, and negative physician information, such as
medical malpractice and disciplinary data. Such access would represent a
compromise between the public's interest in easily accessing a centrally
compiled source of accurate information to make well-informed healthcare
decisions and the government's interest in preserving confidential error
in a physician's profile to the experiences of other physicians in the same specialty in the same
state; (2) a statement explaining that physicians who work with high-risk patients are likely to
have higher numbers of medical malpractice claims; (3) a statement that certain specialties are
more likely to be the subject of litigation; and (4) a statement that "a payment made pursuant to
a medical malpractice action or claim may occur for a variety of reasons which do not
necessarily reflect negatively on the professional competence or conduct of the physician").
135. See supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text (explaining the argument that public
access to the information in the NPDB would diminish error reporting and, therefore, preclude
improving patient safety).
136. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (describing the current availability of
physician information to the general public).
137. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that a plaintiff's attorney may
access the information in the NPDB in limited circumstances anyway); see also infra notes 180-
85 and accompanying text (casting doubt on the traditional arguments against medical
malpractice litigation).
138. As access to the NPDB and the HIPDB are already password-protected, implementing
this option should not be excessively difficult. Note, too, that Congress could consider adding
medical malpractice liability statistics directly to the NPDB search result page to mitigate
confusion in interpreting the information and to allow for more accurate comparisons among
doctors.
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reporting, such as the reporting of near-misses. 139 Importantly, while such
information is currently available to the public through court documents and
state medical board websites, 140 the information is not easily accessible to the
average consumer who likely has little time available to wade through court
records and fifty-one medical board websites to assess a particular physician's
history. Access to physician information that excludes the more sensitive peer
review information and includes information on how to interpret the data
properly is an alternative method of information dissemination that would be
less restrictive to constitutionally protected speech than the system currently in
place.
B. Rebutting Other Arguments Opposing Public Access to the NPDB
The arguments against allowing the public to access the information in the
NPDB are strong and prevalent. However, another constitutional law
consideration casts doubt on some of the traditional arguments against allowing
the public to access such information, and a group of scholars has questioned
the presumed need for confidential error reporting. In light of any doubt in an
area of such importance-patient health and safety--Congress should
reconsider revising the HCQIA.
1. Releasing Information About Physicians Generally
Discussions of public access to the information in the NPDB often raise
issues of physician privacy, as the database contains embarrassing information
that physicians would prefer to keep private-their mistakes and the
consequences of those mistakes. 14 1 With reputations at stake, much of the
discussion in this section will focus on libel suits. Consider the following
scenario--Congress decides to release some of the information in the NPDB to
the general public and a physician finds a grossly incorrect medical malpractice
settlement listed in his profile. The physician could allege defamation and sue
the Department of Health and Human Services for libel, 142 claiming damages
139. Note that this compromise would create a system more analogous to the airline
industry's error-reporting system without requiring a complete overhaul.
140. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (describing the physician information
available to the public under state law).
141. See Berenson, supra note 44, at 668 (noting that the profile might even include a
criminal conviction).
142. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 183-84 (2d pocket ed. 2001) (defining defamation as
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for harm to his reputation and subsequent loss of business. Furthermore,
discussion of public access to the information in the NPDB also raises issues of
patient privacy, as disclosure of physician error may include disclosure of
confidential information about the injured patient. However, with appropriate
protections, modifying the HCQIA to allow the general public to access
physician information in the NPDB would not breach physicians' or patients'
rights of privacy. The physician information in the NPDB could be
disseminated to the public either under the Freedom of Information Act or
generally by classifying physicians as "limited public figures" who sell
commercial products.
a. Disclosure Under FOIA
The argument that the information in NPDB could be disclosed to the
general public through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is not novel.
1 43
Under the FOIA, government agencies must make certain information available
to the public.' a  However, FOIA exempts certain information from
disclosure. 45 As the law presently stands, the information in the NPDB falls
under the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) exception to FOIA146-- dissemination of the
information would not be required because the HCQIA prohibits disclosure.
Even assuming that Congress eventually grants limited access to the NPDB, the
information in the NPDB also could fall under the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)
exception for "files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
"the act of harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person" or "a
false written or oral statement that damages another's reputation"); see also id. at 417 (defining
libel as "a defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp. writing but also a picture,
sign, or electronic broadcast").
143. See, e.g., Julie Barker Pape, Note, Physician Data Banks: The Public's Right to
Know Versus the Physician's Right to Privacy, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 975, 1013-17 (1997)
(noting that arguments to release the information in the NPDB to the public under FOIA usually
fail).
144. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) (listing required agency disclosures).
145. See id. § 552(b) (listing the exemptions to FOIA's disclosure requirements); see also
id. § 552(c) (listing the criminal law enforcement and classified information exclusions to
FOIA's disclosure requirements).
146. Id. § 552(b)(3) exempts from disclosure matters that are:
[SIpecifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this
title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the
public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld.
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unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 147 In other words, if disclosure of the
information in the NPBD would violate personal privacy-either of the patient, of
the physician, or of both---the exception would preclude dissemination under FOIA.
However, dissemination of such information would not violate patients' or
physicians' rights of privacy.
(1). The Patient's Right of Privacy
Under Whalen v. Roe,148 the dissemination of information in the NPDB would
not compromise a patient's right of privacy. In Whalen, the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a New York statute that required maintaining a
database of patients who receive prescriptions for controlled substances. 149 The
plaintiffs in that case-patients who regularly receive prescriptions for controlled
substances, physicians who prescribe such drugs, and two physician associations-
sued just prior to the statute going into effect. 150 The Court first determined that
New York had the authority to create the database, as states have power to
experiment with solutions to local problems.15 ' In addressing the plaintiffs'
argument that the database violated patients' privacy, the Court noted that public
disclosure of the patient information maintained in the database could occur if New
York Heath Department officials failed to maintain proper database security; if the
information was mishandled as part of a judicial proceeding for a controlled
substance violation; or if a patient, doctor, or pharmacist voluntarily disclosed the
information.152 The Court decided that such risks of public disclosure of patient
information did not warrant invalidating the New York statute, as such risks either
were present without the statute or unnecessarily assumed the misuse of
information. 153 Most notably, the Court found no support in the record "for an
assumption that the security provisions of the [New York] statute will be
administered improperly" and that "the remote possibility that judicial supervision of
147. See id. § 552(b)(6) (exempting from disclosure matters that are "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy").
148. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1997).
149. Id. at 591.
150. Id. at 595.
151. See id. at 597-98 (stating that New York's assumption that the database might aid in
the enforcement of drug misuse laws and deter potential drug misuse violations was reasonable).
152. Id. at 600. The Court noted plaintiffs' concern that such public disclosure of patient
information would adversely affect patient reputations and, as a result, deter patients from using
medically proper controlled substances. Id.
153. Id. at 601-02.
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the evidentiary use of particular items of stored information will provide inadequate
protection against unwarranted disclosures is surely not a sufficient reason for
invalidating the entire patient-identification program."' 154 The Court also decided
that the disclosure of patient information in the normal healthcare setting is "an
essential part of modem medical practice," even if such disclosure negatively
reflects the patients' character or deters the use of prescribed controlled substances
and, therefore, held the statute would not invade the patient's right of privacy.
55
The Court also held that the statute did not violate physicians' right to practice
medicine.'
56
Under this precedent, limited access to physician information in the NPDB
would not violate a patient's right of privacy. As patient-identifying information
could be redacted from the portions of the NPDB to which the public would be
granted access, disclosure of patient-identifying information would be minimal.
The Court's decision in Whalen suggests that patients may rely on the Department
of Health and Human Services, and any court that may oversee the use of such
information in litigation, to enforce the security provisions of the databank. Thus,
the patient's right of privacy does not cause the information in the NPDB to fall
under the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) exemption and would not exclude dissemination of
physician information under the FOIA.
157
(2). The Physician's Right of Privacy
Courts have held that "public figures" often waive the "right" to privacy in the
context of defamation and libel proceedings. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
158
154. Id.
155. Id. at 602-04.
156. Id. at 604.
157. This Note also argues that the better approach would be to change the provision of the
HCQIA to allow the public limited access to the information in the NPDB.
158. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of limiting criticism of a public official's conduct. Id. at 268.
The plaintiff, an elected city commissioner, filed suit against the New York Times for
publishing inaccurate criticisms of the city police department he ran. Id. at 256-58. The
plaintiff recovered $500,000 and his judgment was affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.
Id. at 256. The Supreme Court, however, determined that the libel standard applied by
Alabama-allowing a presumption of malice in the determination of general damages-to be
unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 283-84. The Court,
therefore, set forth a new federal standard for libel actions involving public officials: the public
official must prove that the alleged libelous statement "was made with 'actual malice'-that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at
279-80. Under the new standard, the Court determined that the plaintiff did not present
evidence of actual malice, reversed the judgment against the New York Times, and remanded
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the Supreme Court established the following standard for recovery in the
defamation action of a public official: "[proof] that the statement was made with
'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not. 1 59 The Court extended the New York Times
Standard to "public figures," best defined in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,160 as those
people who hold government office, have notorious achievements, vigorously
pursue the public's attention, or occupy positions of persuasive power and
influence.16 1 Such decisions suggest that the dissemination of information--even
negative information-is useful. In fact, the Court in New York Times stated:
"criticism of [a public official's] official conduct does not lose its constitutional
protection merely because it is effective criticism and hence diminishes their official
reputations."162
For example, consider the public's interest in obtaining information about the
candidates in the 2004 presidential election. As the public trusts the President to
address issues immediately impacting their lives,16 3 the public wanted access to as
much information as possible in order to make an informed decision. In the election
context, dissemination of accurate information is a purely logical and primary
concern of each candidate. President Bush and Senator Kerry each established a
the case. Id. at 287, 292.
159. See id. at 279-80 (creating the federal standard for a public official's recovery in a
defamation action).
160. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (holding that the plaintiff
was not a "public figure" in the context of this case and that the New York Times standard does
not apply to private individuals). The Court in Gertz considered whether its New York Times
standard of proof for defamation actions applies to private individuals. Id. at 325. The plaintiff,
a lawyer who had represented the family of a young man killed by a police officer, sued a
magazine for asserting that the suit against the police officer was part of a Communist campaign
against the police and other false information. Id. at 325-26. As a defense, the magazine
claimed that the lawyer was a public figure and, thus, actual malice would be required to
override the constitutional protections of negative press under the New York Times standard. Id.
at 327. The trial court decided that the lawyer was not a public figure to which the New York
Times standard would apply to protect the magazine's negative discussion of a public issue, the
plaintiff did not show that the magazine acted with actual malice, and that judgment should be
entered for the magazine. Id. at 329-30. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 330. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the New York Times standard should not apply to private
individuals and remanded the case. Id. at 352. In other words, a non-"public figure" plaintiff
does not have to prove actual malice in a libel action. Id. at 342-43. The Court noted that the
greater vulnerability of private individuals to reputation injury, due to a lesser access to open
channels of communication than public officials, merited a higher level of protection. Id. at
344-45.
161. See id. at 342, 345 (defining "public figure"). However, the Court suggested that an
individual's status as a public figure might be contextually limited. Id. at 352.
162. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964).
163. At least in theory. Of course, not everyone trusts the president.
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website for the very purpose of disseminating such information and fought hard to
prevent the dissemination of false information. 164 In addition, neutral third parties
established websites that attempted to disseminate unbiased, accurate information
about the candidates.165  The public, too, felt it had a right to receive such
information, as the Court in Gertz noted:
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain
necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk
of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. And society's interest
in the officers of the government is not strictly limited to the formal discharge of
official duties.... [T]he public's interest extends to 'anything which might
touch on an official's fitness for office.... Few personal attributes are more
germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper
motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official's
private character.' 1
66
In the more recent case of Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,167 the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution
164. See The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/president (containing links to President
Bush's biography, current issues, and President Bush's goals for his second term in office) (last
visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Friends of
John Kerry, Inc., www.johnkerry.com (containing links to biographical information about
Senator Kerry and Senator Kerry's vision for America) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
165. See, e.g., Project Vote Smart, www.vote-smart.org (attempting to provide "abundant,
accurate, unbiased and relevant information") (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Project Vote Smart was established in 1992 as a
nonpartisan, objective entity to protect voters from political campaign abuses by providing a
centrally compiled, free source of accurate information about political candidates and issues.
See Project Vote Smart, About Project Vote Smart, http://www.vote-smart.org/program.
about.pvs.php (describing Project Vote Smart) (last visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
166. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974).
167. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). In McIntyre, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous
campaign materials. Id. at 336. Ms. McIntyre had distributed leaflets opposing a school
board's proposed tax levy. Id. at 337. While some of the leaflets identified McIntyre as the
author, other leaflets only identified the views as belonging to "concerned parents and tax
payers." Id. Under Ohio election law, any political advertising must bear the name of the
author. Id. at 338. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed ajudgment against McIntyre, holding the
Ohio statute valid because the burdens on First Amendment rights were reasonable and
nondiscriminatory. Id. at 339-40. The Court, however, decided that the decision to remain
anonymous is an aspect of the First Amendment's freedom of speech. Id. at 342. The Court
noted the state's interests in preventing the dissemination of false information during elections,
but found that the Ohio statute regulated a broad array of pure speech rather than just fraudulent
statements. Id. at 349-53. As the Ohio statute failed an exacting scrutiny analysis, the Court
held the statute to be unconstitutional. Id. at 357.
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of anonymous campaign literature. While the McIntyre case turned on the
constitutionality of allowing the dissemination of anonymously authored political
information, the Court addressed the state's interest in the public receiving
information about political candidates. 168 In particular, the Court stated: "In a
republic where people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation." 
169
The dissemination of accurate information about healthcare providers is
completely analogous to the dissemination of accurate information about political
candidates. Just as the public trusts the President to address safety issues, patients
trust their doctors to address health issues. Just as the public requests accurate
information to make informed political decisions, the public requests accurate
information to make informed healthcare decisions. The illogical ending point of
the analogy is that while the public has easy access to information concerning
individual political candidates, the public does not have access to information
concerning individual physicians. Political candidates are quintessential "public
figures." The Supreme Court named "occupy[ing] positions of ... persuasive
power and influence" as a characteristic of a "public figure" in Gertz 7 °
Physicians certainly occupy positions of persuasive power and influence. At the
micro level, physicians' everyday decisions impact the health and well-being of
individual patients. At the macro level, physicians' decisions, such as research
efforts and willingness to use new technology, affect the overall health and well-
being of the nation. Thus, if physicians are classified as "public figures" who
have waived their "right" to privacy, such as in the context of medical malpractice
judgments or licensure proceedings, the 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) exemption of the
FOIA would not apply to the information in the NPDB and limited physician
information could be disseminated to the public under the FOIA.
17 1
b. Physicians' Services as Commercial Products
A physician has entered the marketplace to sell a product-his services.
As has been stressed throughout this Note, consumers need an adequate
knowledge base by which to choose a physician. In other words, consumers
168. See id. at 349-53 (describing Ohio's interest in the dissemination of truthful
information about political candidates).
169. Id. at 346-47.
170. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
171. Again, the better solution would be for Congress to amend the HCQIA to allow the
public limited access to information in the NPDB.
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need information about the product they are purchasing. As with any product,
the physician's product has positive and negative attributes-pros and cons the
consumer must weigh. The positive aspects of a physician's product include,
for example, the knowledge accompanying his medical degree, the experience
derived from his years of residency and practice, his time, and his personal
skills. The negative aspects of a physician's product include his medical
malpractice history and professional sanctions.
Information about both the positive and the negative characteristics of a
product helps consumers make informed choices. For example, in Pegasus v.
Reno Newspapers, Inc., 7 2 the Supreme Court of Nevada considered the
constitutional protections of negative restaurant reviews, 173 which provide the
public with advice about which restaurants to avoid. The result in the Pegasus
case-the newspaper ultimately was not liable for publishing allegedly false
statements in a review of plaintiffs' restaurant-partially turned on the Court's
finding that the statements constituted opinions in the context of the entire
review, as the Nevada Supreme Court noted that only statements of facts are
actionable as defamation.174 Admittedly, the statements in the NPDB differ
172. Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 57 P.3d 82 (Nev. 2002). In Pegasus, the Nevada
Supreme Court considered whether a negative restaurant review constituted defamation. Id. at
85. A restaurant critic published a negative review of plaintiffs' Mexican restaurant in a Nevada
newspaper. Id. Plaintiffs alleged the review contained false statements, such as suggesting that
the restaurant served prepared, rather than fresh, guacamole. Id. The newspaper claimed that
the statements made in the critique were true and, furthermore, constituted a constitutionally
protected opinion on a matter of public interest. Id. The court's standard for determining
whether the newspaper's statements were actionable for defamation was "whether a reasonable
person would be likely to understand the remark as an expression of the source's opinion or as a
statement of existing fact." Id. at 88. Considering the allegedly false statements in the context
of the entire restaurant review, the court determined that, while a reader may infer true
statements of fact from the review,-that the food served in plaintiffs' restaurant is packaged-
the statements constituted the author's opinion that the food was not freshly prepared. Id. at 89.
As such, the court determined that the statements were not actionable as defamation. Id.
Furthermore, the court applied the Supreme Court's New York Times and Gertz standards-a
defendant is not liable for damages in a defamation action involving a public official or public
figure unless the plaintiff proves actual malice by clear and convincing evidence--to determine
that the plaintiffs' restaurant constituted a limited-purpose public figure in the context of
restaurant reviews. Id. at 90-92. In particular, the court stated that the restaurant was a limited-
purpose public figure "because it has voluntarily entered the public spectrum by providing
public accommodation and seeking public patrons." Id. at 92. In determining that the plaintiff
restaurant had not proven actual malice, the court noted that the restaurant failed to show that
the newspaper knew its statements in the review were false or seriously doubted the truth of its
statements. Id. at 92-93.
173. See id. at 93-94 (concluding restaurant reviews are not necessarily protected opinions
and that restaurants are limited-purpose public figures).
174. See id. at 87 (noting that "[s]tatements of opinion cannot be defamatory because there
is no such thing as a false idea").
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF MODIFYING THE HCQIA
from reviews of the sort the Nevada Supreme Court discussed in Pegasus, as
the information in the NPDB definitely constitutes statements of fact. Thus, in
the scenario contemplated above-Congress has granted limited public access
to the information in the NPDB and a physician has found an error in his
profile-and with issues of sovereign immunity aside, the physician could
bring a defamatory action against the Department of Health and Human
Services. However, the Pegasus Court also noted: "[r]estaurants and other
establishments that actively advertise and seek commercial patronage have been
routinely held to be public figures, at least for the limited purpose of consumer
reporting on their goods and services."'' 75 Thus, with respect to reviews of
quality, a restaurant meets the limited-purpose public figure definition set forth
by the Supreme Court in Gertz-holding a voluntary and prominent role in a
matter of public concern. 176 Note that the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
this case, leaving the decision standing as good law and open to use as
persuasive authority. 177 Physicians hold voluntary and prominent roles in an
extremely important matter of public concern--quality healthcare. Thus,
physicians may qualify as limited-purpose public figures with respect to the
dissemination of information regarding the quality of their products, leaving
open the possibility of granting the public partial access to the NPDB.
2. Maintaining Confidential Error Reporting and Deterring Unintended
Consequences
The arguments against granting the public access to the NPDB do not
entirely convince several health law scholars. In particular, these scholars have
cast doubt on the argument that public access to negative physician information
will discourage error reporting, encourage litigation, and, therefore, preclude
improving patient safety. 178 Most recently, Professors Hyman and Silver
175. Id. at 91-92.
176. See id. at 91 (stating the Supreme Court's test from Gertz for determining whether a
person is a limited public figure as "whether a person's role in a matter of public concern is
voluntary and prominent"); see also supra note 160 and accompanying text (describing Gertz).
177. Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 540 U.S. 817 (2003) (denying writ of certiorari to
Supreme Court of Nevada).
178. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 913 (noting that few scholars disagree with the
"conventional wisdom"). However, Hyman and Silver also state:
[Professor] Jost writes that "advocates [of the conventional wisdom] do not
convincingly explain why health care institutions and professionals will undertake
the hard work of looking for and fixing quality of care problems if they no longer
have to worry about blame or shame." [Professor] Sage similarly observes that
"tort reform is not an intuitive solution to rampant medical error" and that it is
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concluded, "[iut is naive to think that progress on the patient safety front would
occur automatically if the threat of liability were removed."' 79 Hyman and
Silver note that the literature that criticizes medical malpractice liability rarely
cites any authority for good reason: "[n]o statistical study shows an inverse
correlation between malpractice exposure and the frequency of error reporting"
or an inverse correlation between tort liability and healthcare quality. 80 The
professors indicate that the plausibility of the arguments against medical
malpractice liability, rather than the actual truth behind them, may have turned
the arguments into conventional wisdom.'18  In the context of the NPDB,
Professors Hyman and Silver's idea suggests that the public has been denied
access to physician information as a result of assumptions that such access
would have deleterious effects to the healthcare industry. Withholding
information that could aid consumers in a critical task-choosing a physician to
whom a consumer will trust his or her health and well-being-should be based
on more than an assumption. In fact, the professors cite the Harvard Medical
Practice Study as empirical evidence that liability may actually improve patient
safety by making physicians more careful to avoid malpractice claims-exactly
the opposite of the conventional wisdom. 82 The professors also discuss the
Veterans Health Administration (VHA) as an example of conventional wisdom
failing because VHA medical professionals face no medical malpractice
liability individually, yet did not develop a strong error reporting culture sua
sponte.183 Finally, Hyman and Silver suggest that medical malpractice lawsuits
are not necessarily horrible, as lawsuits have motivated medical providers to
address safety issues, have prompted the creation of the informed consent
doctrine, and have encouraged communication about errors.184 Arguments that
unclear why "the medical profession, which historically criticized lawyers for
inventing medical errors where none existed, [should] receive even greater
protection from lawyers now that we know errors to be widespread."
Id. (citations omitted); see also supra notes 54-85 and accompanying text (describing the push
for confidential error reporting to improve patient safety).
179. Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 991.
180. Id. at 914.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 916-17. While the Harvard Medical Practice Study did not produce statistically
strong results, the study found that as the risk of liability increased, the frequency of mistakes
and negligence decreased. Id. at 916. Also note that the Harvard Medical Practice Study was
one of the sources of the startling statistics of medical error in the IOM's Report, described
supra note 4.
183. See Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 933-34 (suggesting that freedom from medical
malpractice liability may not necessarily increase error reporting).
184. See id. at 948 (concluding that the "[medical malpractice] liability system is not
responsible for the continuing failure of providers to improve health care quality").
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cast doubt on conventional wisdom provide justification for Congress to
reconsider modifying the HCQIA to allow the public to access certain
information in the NPDB.
As noted, some health law scholars have suggested revamping the
healthcare industry's error-reporting system to model the error reporting system
of the airline industry so as to encourage error reporting and improve patient
safety.185 However, allowing the public to access portions of the NPDB would
not necessarily defeat the confidential error-reporting goal. Upon deciding to
hire a pilot, a commercial airline has access to that pilot's error history by
requiring an FAA license. 186 However, the airlines do not have access to the
confidential error-reporting system maintained by NASA. Allowing the public
to access certain physician information, such as academic achievements and
malpractice information, but not access other information, such as near misses,
within the NPDB, would seem to promote a dual system analogous to the
airline industry rather than preclude confidential error reporting.
187
3. Federal Regulation of the Healthcare Industry
Healthcare, especially physician licensing, has traditionally been an area of
state regulation. 188  Arguably, the NPDB impinges on traditional state
regulation. 189 However, that argument is generally irrelevant in light of the
plethora of federal healthcare regulations that have superseded traditional state
police powers, such as regulations promulgated by the Drug Enforcement
185. See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text (praising the airline industry's error
reporting system).
186. See, e.g., Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines Flight Operations Department
Information for Prospective Pilots, http://www.southwest.com/careers/pilots.html (requiring
Southwest Airline pilot applicants to hold an FAA Airline Transport Pilot Certificate) (last
visited Dec. 4, 2005) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. Restricting access to certain information would be a way to create a dual-system
analogous to the airline industry without requiring a complete overhaul of the healthcare
industry's present error reporting systems. See also Hyman & Silver, supra note 55, at 953
(noting that the safety successes of the airline industry are also attributed to "cookbook"
practices-specific pre-flight checklists, routine maintenance guidelines, practice in flight
simulators, training programs-that pilots initially interpreted as precluding individual judgment
and discretion). Thus, the airline industry has recognized the value of communication and
cooperation that members of the healthcare industry have not yet embraced. Id. at 954.
188. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text (describing state regulation of
healthcare and physician information available to the general public under state law).
189. See Outterson, supra note 20, at 529 (describing the traditional state police power to
regulate healthcare, but arguing that state licensing and peer review are "duplicative and
unnecessary" in light of the federal NPDB).
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Agency and the Food and Drug Administration.190 In addition, the federal
government has a strong interest in regulating the healthcare industry, as a large
portion of the federal budget goes to funding federal Medicare and Medicaid
programs.191 Finally, from a more theoretical perspective, federal legislation
giving the public access to the NPDB does not give the federal government
more regulatory power. In fact, such legislation should be considered neutral as
to the division of power between federal and state governments and, instead, be
viewed as giving individuals more power over the quality of healthcare they
receive. Thus, traditional state regulation of the practice of medicine would not
preclude Congress from amending the HCQIA to allow the public to access
portions of the federal NPDB.
IV. Conclusion
In light of the commercial nature of the healthcare industry, especially the
status of physicians as limited public figures selling medical services, Congress
should reconsider its refusal to amend the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act to allow the public to access physician information in the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Most importantly, access to a centrally compiled,
accurate source of the positive and negative characteristics of physician services
will facilitate intelligent consumer healthcare purchases. Furthermore, the
commercial nature of the information in the NPDB suggests that the
information is commercial speech entitled to constitutional protections.
Allowing the public to access only physician information and not more
sensitive error information appropriately balances the public's interest in
choosing the best physician and the government's interest in facilitating error
reporting to promote patient safety.
190. See id. at 538 (concluding that technology-advances in medicine, advances in
transportation, and the creation of the Intemet-"weakens the presumption that there is
something uniquely local about healthcare" and supports an expansion of federal power over
healthcare).
191. See, e.g., VICTORIA WACHINO ET AL., KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE
MATCHING FUNDS 18 (Jan. 2004), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/7000.cfm ("Medicaid is by far
the single largest form of federal grant support to states, accounting for 43 percent of all federal
grant funds to states ... ").
